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36 min ago 5 min read
A largely invisible supply risk linked to bromine may prove more disruptive to semiconductor production than recent helium shortages, according to Alvin Camba, Lead Scientist and Director of Research at Lyvi, an AI-driven supply chain and risk analysis firm.
The risk stems from limited global capacity to process bromine into semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide, exposing a critical chokepoint in the chip supply chain.
Around two-thirds of global bromine production comes from Israel and Jordan, with much of it extracted and processed by Israel’s ICL Group. While exports are routed through Mediterranean ports, the proximity of key facilities to the ongoing conflict has raised concerns over potential disruption.
South Korea, which dominates global memory production, sources the vast majority of its bromine imports from Israel.
The issue, explored in a recent gasworld , centres on bromine’s role in producing semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide – a specialty gas used to etch key structures on wafers for chips.
Speaking to gasworld, Camba stressed that the main constraint is not actually bromine itself.
“The bottleneck is conversion capacity, not raw bromine,” he explained, adding that bromine can be sourced from US companies like Albemarle and TETRA Technologies.
The gap lies in the specialised purification infrastructure required to produce semiconductor-grade gas, which does not exist at scale outside the current supply chain.
“Raw bromine is abundant enough; the chokepoint is the purification step,” he said.
Building new capacity would take years due to permitting, equipment and qualification requirements.
And a disruption is likely to propagate “faster than most people assume.”
According to Camba, DRAM – a type of volatile memory inside PCs and smartphones – suppliers currently hold only two to three weeks of inventory and a direct hit on an ICL facility is not necessary for major disruption to occur.
“War risk insurance for vessel calls at Israeli ports has already risen sharply, adding up to $500,000 in costs per voyage on a mid-sized cargo ship,” explained Camba, adding that the war risk premium follows the port, not the route.
Within four to six weeks of a production disruption, shortages would begin hitting fab production lines.
“And within eight to 12 weeks, the effect would propagate across everything from consumer devices to military systems.”

Much of the world’s bromine supply is sourced from the Dead Sea region, creating a geographically concentrated supply chain. ©ICL Group
There are also no viable substitutes. Chlorine-based alternatives exist but they are not effective enough at advanced DRAM node geometries.
“Chlorine is not a drop-in substitute,” explained Camba. “It is a fundamentally inferior chemistry for the precision the process demands.”
Even if an alternative chemistry existed in theory, the qualification barrier alone would take years. Any alternative would require years of qualification, making short-term substitution unrealistic.
“Samsung and SK hynix are not going to risk yield on their highest-value lines on an unqualified process chemistry while they are already sold out through 2026.”
It is also unlikely that existing producers outside Israel could realistically scale up in time.
Existing producers such as Resonac, Air Liquide and Adeka are already fully committed to major customers, leaving little spare capacity.
AI infrastructure buildout is accelerating demand across the board, meaning outside producers are already stretched thin against a growing baseline.
“Even if expansion were theoretically possible, South Korean fabs would be competing for that capacity with Taiwan, Samsung’s own logic operations, and China simultaneously.”
The bromine risk “sits outside every dashboard anyone is monitoring,” he said, warning that while were visible, bromine’s lack of immediate impact could make it more dangerous.
“Helium got attention because the Qatar Ras Laffan disruption was visible and immediate with spot prices doubling within days.”
He added that the structural failure is not the war itself, but that the global memory supply chain has built itself around a conversion chokepoint with no redundancy and no fallback.
“The gap between what is available now and what is actually needed is measured in years,” he said, warning that the window to address the risk is already closing.










